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Solidarity with China as it holds the global front line during COVID-19 outbreak  
On December 27, 2019 local health authorities in Wuhan received a report showing four 
cases of pneumonia patients carrying an unknown virus. On December 31, the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) China Country Office was informed of cases of pneumonia of unknown 
cause. Within less than two weeks, China uploaded gene sequencing on January 10. WHO 
declared a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) on January 30. As of 
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February 24, 77,054 cases of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) had been reported in China 
with more than 2400 deaths. Eight weeks into the outbreak, the number of cases outside of 
China to date is 1,936 with 23 deaths.  
 
The timeline of response in China was comparable if not faster to that of the 2009/2010 
pandemic outbreak of the new influenza A (H1N1) virus in North America, which originated 
in Mexico in March 2009, and soon reached California and spread across the United States.
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This was reported to WHO on April 18, and the gene sequencing was uploaded on April 24.
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WHO declared a PHEIC on the next day (April 25) and raised the level of influenza 
pandemic alert from phase 3 to phase 5 in less than 5 days, signalling a pandemic was 
imminent. WHO also requested that all countries immediately activate their preparedness 
plans and be on high alert for an unusual outbreak of an influenza-like illness and severe 
pneumonia. Within a month, by May 18, 2009, 8,829 A(H1N1) cases had been reported in 40 
countries. The level of influenza pandemic alert was eventually raised to phase 6, the highest 
level, on June 11. By the end of the pandemic, the United States Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) estimated global deaths reached 151,700 – 575,400, with 60.8 million 
estimated cases, 274,304 hospitalizations, and 12,469 deaths in the U.S.
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In response to COVID-19, China invested an unprecedented amount of resources in epidemic 
control in economic, socio-cultural, and personnel terms. Across the country, all economic 
activity and celebrations for the lunar new year were halted for more than four weeks starting 
in late January. The first city on complete lockdown was Wuhan in Hubei province, the 
epicentre, on January 23, followed by at least 48 cities and four provinces, affecting 
approximately 500 million people - 6.3% of the world‟s population, and more than the entire 
population of the United States or European Union. To contain the epidemic, China imposed 
travel restrictions on its own residents, denying travel visas to those wanting to leave, and 
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stopping all overseas tours – a self-imposed control measure intended to prevent the virus 
from spreading abroad.  
 
Though the virus that causes COVID-19 seems to be highly contagious, as of February 24, 
the epidemic had been largely contained within Hubei province. In addition to Hubei, only 4 
out of 32 provincial-level administrative divisions in mainland China had a cumulative 
confirmed case count over 1,000, ranging from 1,016 (Hunan) to 1,342 (Guangdong);
2
 all had 
laboratory-confirmed deaths of fewer than 20.
2
 Within Hubei province, cases and deaths have 
been mostly concentrated in Wuhan and a handful of neighbouring cities (Figure 1).
2
 These 
epidemic control efforts bought life-saving time for the rest of the country and the 
international community, allowing for more research on COVID-19 for treatment strategies, 
development and production of diagnostic testing and vaccines, as well as local planning for 
epidemic preparedness and response. Table 1 presents the estimated case fatality rates (CFR) 
based on confirmed deaths over cases.
2
 The numbers highlighted the tremendous stress on the 
physical and psychosocial health of the front line workers. Furthermore, the call of duty as 
care provider, guilt for not putting loved ones first, the risking of their own health and lives, 
and even mistreatment by their own community as potential disease carriers all added to the 
burden of their choice to fight this fight on the front lines. 
Although it is impossible to ascertain the precise CFR for COVID-19 at this point in time, it 
has already become clear that the CFR is far lower than that of previous coronavirus 
outbreaks like SARS (10%)
3
 or MERS (34.4%)
4
, and public communication and media 
reporting should provide factual communication on epidemiological data available and be 
cautious in distinguishing „real risks‟ vs „perceived risks‟ in their messaging. The fatality 
rates reported outside of Hubei province are closer to the rates of exported cases reported by 
international community (0.8% and 1.2%, respectively). The difference in fatality rates 
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between Hubei vs non-Hubei provinces (3.7% and 0.8%, respectively) may be attributed to 
both clinical and non-clinical factors during a large-scale public health emergency such as a 
lack of information regarding the health threat during early days of response, failure of the 
early warning and mitigation systems, compromised standard of care, exceeded surge 
capacity, and limited access to care.  
 
An outbreak can happen anytime, anywhere, and can affect anyone. Unfortunately, the largest 
epidemic control effort ever put forth to contain one single epidemic in human history has 
been met with negativity from the international community, with the onset of strict travel 
restrictions, mass evacuations, and widespread flight cancellations in early February, despite 
WHO advising against them. This response was disproportionate to what was seen even at 
the highest level of global alert during the A(H1N1) pandemic. Before COVID-19 spread 
beyond mainland China, hostility had already emerged in lands far away from the epicentre 
with lamentable instances of fearmongering, racism in the media, misleading rumours and 
conspiracy theories, and discrimination and violence against Chinese/East Asian expat 
communities. Stigmatization and discrimination during epidemics have been well-
documented and consistently correlated with racism and xenophobia, often spread through 
the media.
5,6
 When diseases are thought to be deadly, some cope with their fears by blaming 
new outbreaks on individuals or groups outside of their own social circle. Often, people 
whose national, ethnic, or religious backgrounds are different from those of the “mainstream” 
group/media are accused of spreading the disease, exacerbating already existing racial and 
political tensions - for example, Chinese people in the current outbreak and Africans during 
the Ebola epidemic.
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 In Asia, several media outlets have opted to use „Wuhan-pneumonia‟
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instead of COVID-19 in their reporting even though WHO has explicitly advised against 
naming new human infectious diseases with geographic locations or populations since 2015. 
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By employing framing strategy to “other” a subgroup in society, the media draws attention to 
certain aspects of the issue and alienates one sub-community from the rest of the population 
as the leading culpable factor for an outbreak. Such tactics often fuel public fear and 
discrimination, and are often conveyed not only through descriptive narratives but also 
through the images shown to the audience as part of the news story. A recent Wall Street 
Journal opinion piece
8
 did just that with selected images and a racist headline - “China is the 
Real Sick Man of Asia” – referencing a phrase that ironically originated from the late 19th 
century of colonial exploitation when Western powers used political and military forces to 
pressure China to import opium (in exchange for Chinese tea), which made many Chinese 
people “sick”. Further, social media tends to lead to “echo chambers” of people who share 
inaccurate and sometimes racist information among those with pre-existing views towards 
certain subgroups of society, reinforcing confirmed bias.  
 
For years, scientists have been warning of the next global disease pandemic;
9
 there is no 
doubt whether it will come – it is only a question of when and where. Whichever front line 
they are fighting on, medical professionals everywhere abide by the same oath to treat the 
sick. The extraordinary containment efforts on the Chinese front line have come at a high 
price – to date, over 3,000 Chinese medical professionals have been infected with COVID-19 
according to China CDC and at least ten have lost their lives.
2
 Many have worked without 
adequate personal protective equipment (PPE). The passing of Dr. Wenliang Li
10
, a whistle-
blower who attempted to warn peer clinicians about the novel virus in its early days, ignited 
an overwhelming social movement in China calling for system improvement and expressing 
solidarity with front line health care workers. Pleas for support from the front line triggered 
an outpouring of societal response where many non-profit organizations, Chinese residents in 
the country, and overseas expats self-organized supply chains to send medical supplies 
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directly to Wuhan. The fight between disease and human survival has always been a global 
fight. Ensuring sufficient medical supplies on the front line and minimizing economic losses 
to Chinese residents will help sustain the extraordinary containment efforts that have been 
well over-stretched. 
 
Disease knows neither borders nor politics. In the midst of a health crisis, media and 
politicians should refrain from abusing their power as information disseminators. Individuals 
may avoid getting misled by fact-checking and debunking rumours as they encounter them. 
Scientists and trusted authorities within the country and from the international community 
should confront such abuse with immediate, resolute, and consistent action. Communication 
strategies should be developed to counter the conspiracy theories, fake news, and the racism 
and xenophobic content sometimes found in the public forum. 
 
China, a developing country making its initial entrance to the global health arena, has taken 
extensive measures in fighting an epidemic outbreak on the global front line. Many lessons 
learnt from current response should be examined with great scrutiny for future improvement 
for the protection of the public and the responders, especially the early warning and public 
health preparedness systems. To the scientists, medical and public health professionals, and 
citizens who have been under quarantine or on lockdown with no clear timetable for 






1. U.S. Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC). 2009 H1N1 Pandemic 
(H1N1pdm09 virus). https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/2009-h1n1-pandemic.html 
(Last accessed in February, 21, 2020). 
2. Dingxiangyuan. 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19) real-time statistics. 
Dingxiangyuan (https://ncov.dxy.cn/ncovh5/view/pneumonia). Accessed on 23 February 
2020. 
3. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Severe acute 
respiratory syndrome - Annual Epidemiological Report 2016. December 2016. 
https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-annual-
epidemiological-report-2016-2014-data (Last accessed in February, 21, 2020). 
4. World Health Organisation (WHO). Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus 
(MERS-CoV), November 2019. https://www.who.int/emergencies/mers-cov/en/ (Last 
accessed in February, 21, 2020). 
5. Allgaier J, Svalastog AL. The communication aspects of the Ebola virus disease 
outbreak in Western Africa--do we need to counter one, two, or many epidemics? Croat Med 
J 2015;56:496-9. 
6. Sarah M. Ebola as African: American Media Discourses of Panic and Otherization. 
Africa Today 2017;63:3-27. 
7. [Wuhan-pneumonia: 79366 confirmed cases worldwide, 2619 deaths] Liberty Time 
Net. https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/3077687 (Last accessed 24 February 
2020). 2020. 
8. Mead WR. China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia. Wall Street Journal. February 3, 2020. 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-is-the-real-sick-man-of-asia-11580773677. (Last 
accessed in February, 21, 2020). 
8 
 
9. Global Preparedness Monitoring Board (GPMB). A world at risk: Annual report on 
global preparedness for health emergencies. (https://apps.who.int/gpmb/annual_report.html). 
2019. 
10. Yuan L. Widespread Outcry in China Over Death of Coronavirus Doctor. New York 
Times. Feb. 7, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/business/china-coronavirus-
doctor-death.html (Last accessed in February, 21, 2020). 
 
Figure 1. Confirmed COVID-19 cases in Hubei Province
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Cities in Hubei Province Chinese provinces China International 
Location Wuhan Non-Wuhan Hubei Non-Hubei 3.2% 1.2% 
Case fatality 4.0% 2.7% 3.7% 0.8% 
(1856/46201) (490/17883) (2346/64084) (100/12970) (2446/77054) (23/1936) 
 
